Ejindu:
I am glad to meet you, Sir. How would you feel if you knew that you are being
regarded as a hero?
Nzeogwu:
Very pleased naturally. But the truth is that I am not a hero. If there was any
famous Major Nzeogwu, I have never heard of him....
Ejindu:
It is rumoured that you have just finished writing a book, what is it like?
Nzeogwu:
Good gracious! Ninety-nine per cent of all the stories you hear in this country
are false. I have not written any book because there was nothing to write
about. You can only write about a
finished
job. It would have been a useful means of warding off boredom though, but one
did not do it for the fear that the authorities might seize the papers. However
I had enough time to make detailed notes on what happened, and one might use
them if in future there was any need to write something.
Ejindu:
Before you went into prison, the cloud was so clear above this country that one
could see very far into the future. Now that you are out, what do you see ?
Nzeogwu:
A job very badly done. If I may borrow your metaphor, the atmosphere is
admittedly somewhat cloudy. But I don't think there will be rain. Indeed if you
look steadily up you will find that the sun is not yet set and might still peep
through. The trouble is that people generally can't tell which is a rain cloud
and which is not, and as a result they tend to be confused. As you know there
is too much bitterness at present in the country, and in the past people had
imagined that they could conveniently do without one another. But the
bitterness will clear in the end and they will find that they are not as self-reliant
as they had thought. And they will long to be together.... The .same applies to
the Northerners. It may take ten or fifteen years for them to come together
again but there is no doubt, as far as I can see, that they will. You see, in
this world of imperfection, it is sometimes very difficult to capture the
ideal. But we can, at Ieast start with the second best.
Ejindu:
What is the second best?
Nzeogwu:
A Confederation.
Ejindu:
Before I come back to that, may 1 take you back to January, 1966. What exactly
happened at Nassarawa (the premier's residence at Kaduna) on the night of the
14th?
Nzeogwu:
No, no, no; don't ask me anything about that, I don't want to remember it.
Ejindu:
All right. A lot has been talked and written about the January coup. But how
tribalistic was it really in conception and execution?
Nzeogwu:
In the North, no. In the South, yes. We were five in number, and initially we
knew quite clearly what we wanted to do. We had a short list of people who were
either undesirable for the future progress of the country or who by their
positions at the time had to be sacrificed for peace and stability. Tribal
considerations were completely out of our minds at this stage. But we had a
set-back in the execution. Both of us in the North (himself and Major T. C.
Onwuatuegwu) did our best. But the other three who were stationed in the South
failed because of incompetence and misguided considerations in the eleventh
hour. The most senior among them (possibly Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna) was in
charge of a whole brigade and had all the excuse and opportunity in the world
to mobilize his troops anywhere, anyhow and any time. He did it badly. In
Lagos, even allowing for one or two genuine mistakes, the job was badly done.
The Mid-West was never a big problem. But in the East, our major target,
nothing practically was done. He and the others let us down.
Ejindu:
You must have anticipated that Gen. Ironsi would let you down in the end. Why
did you surrender to him the way you did?
Nzeogwu:
I was being sensible. The last thing we desired was unnecessary waste of life.
If I had stuck to my guns there would have been a civil war, and as the
official head of the Army, he would have split the loyalty of my men. Again,
you must remember that the British and other foreigners were standing by to
help him. Our purpose was to change our country and make it a place we could be
proud to call our home, not to wage war.
Ejindu:
It has been said that Gen. Ironsi set out to complete your job for you. Was
there anything you did not like in his administration ?
Nzeogwu:
Yes, everything. First he chose the wrong advisers for the work he
halfheartedly set out to do. Most of them were either mediocre or absolutely
unintelligent. Secondly, he was tribalistic in the appointment of his
governors. Thirdly the Decree 34 (which nullified the federal constitution and
established a unitary government) was unnecessary, even silly. In fact . . .
Ejindu:
But you wanted a unitary government ?
Nzeogwu:
No. Not a unitary government as such. We wanted to see a strong centre. We
wanted to cut the country to small pieces, making the centre inevitably strong.
We did not want to toy with power, which was what he did.
Ejindu:
Tell me, what do you think of him as a soldier?
Nzeogwu:
I am afraid I cannot tell you that. But I will say that as a person he was very
well liked and as the Supreme Commander, his orders were promptly carried out.
Ejindu:
If he joined the Army as a gunner, he must have progressed as a military
strategist ?
Nzeogwu:
Yes, if he had, he could have done so. But he actually joined the Army as a
tally-clerk and was a clerk most of the time.
Ejindu:
From the present chaos, what type of Nigeria do you envisage?
Nzeogwu:
In the first place, secession will be ill-advised, indeed impossible. Even if
the East fights a war of secession and wins, it still cannot secede.
Personally, I don't like secession and if this country disintegrates, I shall
pack up my things and go. In the present circumstances, confederation is the
best answer as a temporary measure. In time, we shall have complete unity. Give
this country a confederation and, believe me, in ten or fifteen years the young
men will find it intolerable, and will get together to change it. And it is
obvious we shall get a confederation or something near it. Nothing will stop
that.
Ejindu:
Do you think there will be any war?
Nzeogwu:
No. Nobody wants to fight. The East which is best equipped and best prepared
for war, does not want to attack anybody. The North cannot fight. And Lagos
cannot fight now. If they had attacked the East in August or September, they
would have had a walk-over. Today, I think they will be ill-advised to try.
Ejindu:
An Englishman said to me the other day that the best thing Ojukwu can do is to
take over Lagos. Do you think he can do it even if he wanted to?
Nzeogwu:
Yes, I think the East is strong enough to do it if they want to. But it will
serve no useful purpose. It can only serve to destroy life and property. You
see, the effective power does not lie in Lagos but in Kaduna, and if you remove
Gowon somebody else will take his place. If you capture the South against the
North, all you can achieve is civil war, disintegration and border cla
Reference:
Crisis
and Conflict in Nigeria, January
1966 -
July 1967. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.
Oxford
Univeristy Press, 1971
No comments:
Post a Comment